1) La "critica" di I. Kant alla "ragione pura" del razionalismo
La Critica della ragion pura di Kant affronta il razionalismo, soprattutto la pretesa di poter conoscere Dio e le sue idee, le essenze delle cose. Questa critica è parzialmente giusta: concerne l'oggetto della metafisica che diventa nel razionalismo Dio stesso. Infatti in Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff e Baumgarten la metafisica assume il compito di pensare le idee di Dio per dedurre da esse le cose di questo mondo fino alla loro esistenza, tentando to convert the contingent "truths of fact" in need "truth of reason." In this way, as Kant criticism, this metaphysics moves between abstract concepts only, no support on the empirical world. [1] The task assigned to the rationalistic reason surpasses his cognitive capacity.
You could hear an echo, perhaps from a text by Plato, Respublica, [2] that his science "dialectic," came when the first principle, proceed only with concepts from the beginning to the ideas (the essences of things) because has over another assumption but, on the contrary, the assumption of all ideas. However, the traditional metaphysics, coming from Plato and Aristotle, is very different from that moderna razionalistica, perché parte dalle cose di questo mondo sensibile, con il loro essere contingente causato per cercare le loro cause essenziali intelligibili. Solo, alla fine, essa arriva con argomenti dimostrativi a una prima causa trascendente, identificata con Dio.
Platone pone anche le essenze delle cose, le cosidd. idee, come trascendenti, "separate" dalle cose; il che era un errore, che già Aristotele poi corregge. Ma ambedue insegnano che le cose hanno le loro essenze e arrivano alla prima causa trascendente. Per ambedue l'oggetto primario della metafisica sono le cose del mondo, con le loro essenze.
La critica di Kant, sebbene affrontando soltanto il razionalismo moderno, pretende, però, di essere valida contro metaphysics in general, not respecting the diversity important - we have just considered - between modern and traditional metaphysics, ancient and medieval origin, which Kant did not have a closer and more accurate knowledge.
2) The limits of knowledge in the traditional sense
the Sophists in ancient philosophy, arguing about the limits of human knowledge to end in relativism or, more radically, nell'agnosticismo, as in Gorgias of Leontini. Plato was confronted with the claims of the Sophists and their ultimate consequences. Then, even Aristotle.
Today the predominant opinion that only with Kant's philosophy has developed a "critical", unlike the ancient and medieval metaphysics that in a "naive" has made statements about being the real, without critical reflection on them, with the exception of the Sophists, who were the true precursors of Descartes and Kant.
J. Maréchal [3] explains the history of ancient philosophy unilaterally on this side: From the standpoint of Kant's philosophy, he leaves to start with the ancient Sophists, whereas the philosophy of the Presocratics as yet mythical. However, one can not ignore the beginnings of natural philosophy in Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, Parmenides, even in the ontology. Plato and Aristotle were re-established them and refuted skepticism sophistic very valid.
Important is that both are aware limits of human knowledge. It is only fair to give Kant the merit of being "critical" and accuse the front as "dogmatic." Moreover, precisely in Kant is so dogmatic. You do not need an author to look only to what he says but what he gives.
For both Plato and Aristotle for the first transcendent cause, arrives in their metaphysics, surpassing the knowledge of the human intellect, because Plato determines how the "idea of \u200b\u200bideas." Aristotle taught that the first cause "in its essence is its act," [4] that is identically to its being fully relevant causal, while the human intellect knows the essence of being and only as two different things in the world. Di fatto le cose manifestano il loro essere come essere causato, cioè come "esistenza" (che significa: venire fuori da una causa), a differenza della loro essenza (che concerne le cause).
Visto più da vicino, Aristotele[5] distingue due limiti della conoscenza umana, uno dalla parte dell'oggetto, e uno dalla parte del soggetto: i limiti oggettivi si effettuano in due modi, o perché l'oggetto è sopra-intelligibile, cioè Dio, che trascende la nostra conoscenza diretta, o perché l'oggetto è sotto-intelligibile, cioè la materia prima che per definizione è il sostrato per tutte le forme conoscibili. Secondo Aristotele essa non esiste separatamente dalle forme, ma è raggiungibile dall'intelletto only indirectly, for reductionem, if you take any form. [6]
objective limits to these two limits are subjective because the intellect is not able to adequately meet the above-intelligible nor God, nor the sub-intelligible material. In fact, the intellect is different from the sensory faculties, having as the intelligible, that is the essence of the empirical things that is much more than their material. The intellect is, therefore, over the matter but under the divine substance that is transcendent to the empirical world and the intellect. Note that the tradition does not ignore the limits of human knowledge from the subject / intellect, and sees it in connection with the objective limit imposed by the nature of such things.
3) The limits of empirical knowledge in the modern sense
modern empiricism the limit of human knowledge have any real meaning at least as it is forced to reason from the objects. Of course this is a really small because the things of nature, according to the empiricist, there are only phenomena, not things in themselves. The only thing substantially, if applicable, would the body or the material behind the phenomena. At this empiricism of things is an empirical knowledge that reduces the empirical world, restricted within the limits of intuition psychic. What can not appear in it, can not be taken as an object intellect.
J. Locke [7] and D. Hume [8] have developed the epistemological empiricism in a complete theory, exposing the elements from which knowledge is acquired: that "impressions" perceptions and "ideas" that is formed by those concepts. Both deny, against all "Platonism," the cosidd. "Innate ideas" in favor of abstraction "Aristotelian." [9]
Now, in my opinion, the criticism of the theory of innate ideas is right, which, however, as it appears in the two thinkers, is no longer Plato, in fact, they did not teach that there are ideas in the soul but it's supposed ideas as real objects separated from the things and the subject / intellect, in which there are only reminiscent of the ideas (world views in the front).
Concerning the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of abstraction is to avoid a serious misunderstanding modern empirical source, that the only source of human knowledge were the sensitive data of empirical things. In truth, however, the understanding of being of things and the ontological reflection on it is not from abstraction but is its prerequisite. The understanding includes the formal aspect of the being of things immediately, and according to this Contact ontological begins to get sensitive materials from the data of things as their vital data intelligible, by abstraction from the concrete material. The assumption
for all empirical knowledge is not only the well being of things (even more) to be of the same mind. In this sense, Leibniz has overcome the empiricism of J. Locke. The thesis "Aristotelian" of the latter - that nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in SensiBus, Leibniz [10] responded brilliantly: nisi ipse intellectus.
4) The limits of knowledge according to Kant: the self-limitation of reason, Kant
imposed by Kant, as you know, fights English empiricism empiricist but assumes a premise which is that our knowledge is limited to the empirical world of things reduced to phenomena. However, this limit - for the more objective empiricist - Kant subjective change in a limit, after turning his "Copernican" trascendentalistica. In fact, Kant also fights rationalism, even assuming this to be an assumption that the knowledge that the items contain more than "material", perceived in retrospect, even those "formal" a priori forms of intuition sensitive, space and time, and categorical forms inherent in understanding and form of transcendental consciousness.
However, in my opinion these assumptions are Kant's dogmatic and not confirmed by our simple self-consciousness. Who does not see that taking catagoriali in understanding of the forms is similar to the recruitment of innate ideas?! Just as the Kantian doctrine of "ideas" soul, world and God is immanentist. Kantian transcendentalism in the formal and material components of things - according to the traditional philosophy of nature is their formal and material causes - are transferred to the subject and become formal and material conditions of all knowledge objects that constitute the stuff here-phenomena. How strange naturalism in epistemology of Kant!
In this way, the "limit" (in the traditional sense) objective things that put our knowledge and our reason is now (in the sense trascendentalistico) a "restriction" placed by reason or intellect to the things-objects qua phenomena. This totally changes the meaning of "limit": this is not more things in an objective way, which makes the intellect to critically examine his limited knowledge, limited knowledge and his strength, but becomes a constitutive activity of the intellect of the objects. Knowing is no longer be determined by things, but now becomes a determinative. From the traditional point of view we can see that Kant is missing in their self-critique of reason that he wanted to take. Instead of recognizing the limits of his strength, the reason for the over-estimate as if it could be the world of things, phenomena here. In this way the subject take the place of the causes constitutive of the things themselves, as immanent and the transcendent God. The right Kantian critique rationalism, which claims to take the thoughts of God, replace false with the divine reason that human, claiming the ability to set up the empirical world. Kant is the philosopher who, promising to submit a critical reason to the limits of his knowledge (metaphysics), puts it, dogmatically, in an absolute position that has the ability to limit or to establish and determine the subject and the knowledge (trascendentalistica) . In this way, Kant is right to submit the limits it imposes on itself - on behalf of reason! From
transcendentalism comes, then, the idealism that exaggerates even more the activity of reason that the human spirit, making part of the divine spirit / the "Weltgeist", which grows in the form of creative self-restraint to the world and man. The theological doctrine of the tradition according to which knowledge of God is simultaneously creative things, is secular, so to speak, and transferred to the human knowledge that is now part of the creative activity of Weltgeist. Viewed more closely, however, reveals the great difference between the two doctrines: the traditional God, in which knowledge and create the same, does not follow from epistemological reflection of the human on his cognitive activity, but a metaphysical reflection on the substance of the divine, because the intellect human is completely missing the experience of a coincidence of thinking and creating, the only possible conclusion from the divine intellect.
5) Position regarding cosidd. "Antinomies"
Kant sees a secure confirmation of his critique of metaphysics in fact all knowledge of cosidd. "Antinomies" cosmological exposed in the third part of the Critique of Pure Reason. [11] The work aims to show precisely because they are not resolvable and explains that they are caused by a disagreement between the sensory and the intellectual faculties, is expressed in theses and the antitheses of each antinomy which make up the two addresses opposite of rationalism and empiricism, because the arguments are represented the rationalist, the antithesis of empiricism.
Against the Kantian doctrine of the antinomies arise, in my opinion, at least two objections. The first is for the methodology: since the cosidd. cosmological antinomies relate to a problem from the side of objects, from the physical world, a possible resolution should be sought on this side, not on the side of the subject, taking a dogmatic disagreement between sensitivity and intellect of which we know nothing in our experience. In truth, we are aware only of the essential difference between the two faculties, however, consuonano in a wonderful collaboration [12].
The other objection to the arguments of the antinomies that, in my opinion, are well solved if you take away the mistakes of unilateral positions rationalist and empiricist one of which is reflected in the thesis and antithesis. Kant, however, taking on both a rational and an empirical basis, with their errors, combining both in his transcendentalism and strengthens the errors. Let's look more closely at the first antinomy: the thesis that says the world has a beginning in time and is confined within the limits of space, [13] the antithesis instead says that the world has a beginning and not locked up in limits, but monsters are infinite in time and space. [14] The arguments of both
not proceed in a direct demonstration of each defended their position, but indirectly by reduction to absurdity of the opposite position.
Il razionalista metafisico confuta l'antitesi empiristica cioè che il mondo sia divisibile, in tempo e spazio, nelle sue parti all'infinito, argomentando che in tal modo non si arriverebbe mai a un totale che si rappresenta come mondo. Tuttavia, questo argomento non è costringente perché la teoria fisica del calcolo infinitesimale riconosce anche un infinito entro il finito, quando una serie infinitesimale va verso un valore limite determinato. Inoltre obietterei soprattutto che l'argomento non difende la posizione metafisica dell'unità sostanziale del mondo intero, neppure quella di ogni cosa del mondo, perché questa è ben diversa da un totale quantitativo. Infatti, secondo la dottrina tradizionale dei cosidd. trascendentali, everything is a substantial body, a, knowable, real good and so these features are in first place in the first category of substance, not accidental that the quantity that physicists measure, and they are intelligible, non-sensitive, ie they are included only by the intellect in the same things because empirical connection with their being.
The error of considering "the institution" as sensitive data is located in the ancient Heraclitus when he denied the agency - the constancy of sensible things - but not as apparent to the senses, but in truth things are in a continuous flow of changes. On the contrary, Parmenides turns out, for the first time, that being the things that are treated as "entity" is intelligible, not more sensitive, and denies any change. I would like to note that after Parmenides atoms, as well as the Sophists Gorgias and Protagoras, speaks of "entity" but consider the empirical things as something sensible, not as intelligible! Democritus will falsely atoms and the void as the "body" and "non-entity." Protagoras declares the man as a "measure of all institutions that they are, and not entities that they are not", but nevertheless considers things only as sensitive, as shown by his example with the air which appears' a hot, another cold, and so on. The proposition of man as the measure of things it refers to sensory perception and ends in a sensualist or empirical relativism.
course, a metaphysics of substances whose unity is understood as all material standard is open to empirical criticism expounded by Kant in the topic of the antithesis that is all that any given in time and space is divisible wholesale (de) finite so that even the whole world loses its unity as the metaphysical understanding. However, the argument does not apply before the traditional metaphysics which relates to empirical things but not as sensitive as intelligible as complex come true, especially the natural living things, in fact, consist of material causes and formal causes. Even if their matter was divisible wholesale (de) finite - and potentialiter it is for Aristotle - the substantial unity of a thing, due to their formal cause. In animals, this is a vital principle (no more material) that combines elements of a living organism. According to Kant
being substantially flattens the space-time items stay here phenomena - which is unacceptable.
6) Conclusion
I conclude my remarks on the limits of knowledge according to Kant, I would point out that the main problem is revealed, however, in a recent treaty Andrea Gentile on the same subject [15].
The author interprets the Critique of Pure Reason Kant in such a way that leads us "within the bounds of reason" with the doctrines of the a priori conditions of experience, which are the forms of space and time sensitive intuition, the categories of the understanding and the form of ' -I think of transcendental consciousness. Kantian theory proposes this kind of experience [16] and reaffirms the reason that Kant, in an effort to achieve universal a priori knowledge, can only be achieved within the limits of the empirical world.
The limits of rational knowledge is a priori, as its foundation, the limited scope of a possible experience. Thus, the Kantian critique of rationalism to the three disciplines: psychology, cosmology and theology, consists mainly in ciò che queste trattano di tre sostanze, le quali non possono essere date in una possibile esperienza, nell'intuizione sensitiva.
Di fatto, Kant voleva difendere la fisica di I. Newton, contro l'empirismo di D. Hume che nega ogni conoscenza apriori scientifica, cioè universale e necessaria. Soprattutto i ragionamenti scientifici che combinare effetti con cause, Hume ha spiegato con il costume degli uomini di fare tali combinazioni.
Kant invece spiega il ragionamento scientifica assumendo nell'intendimento la categoria della causalità. Tuttavia, la critica di Kant a Hume non è molto forte, sostituendo soltanto la tesi di Hume del costume con la tesi della categoria della causalità nell'intendimento.
A mio parere, Kant leads us to the borders of reason, imposed by himself under the influence of empiricism. In fact, the limitation of rational knowledge within the scope of experience, based on intuition sensitive, results from two premises that piristiche em-1, that the being of things is a sensitive data - which is sensible intuition - and 2 ° that the man does not have an intellectual intuition. Therefore, neither the soul nor God can become the object of rational knowledge. However, both assumptions contradict our simple natural conscience, which is an act of the intellect and which things in their being given, both external objects, and the intellect, as subject, which is given to itself. Although it is true that we do not have an intellectual intuition of the essence of things and of ourselves, of our soul or our intellect, [17] However there are things external to the intellect, in his conscience, and intellect himself, in the self. This
intellect represent itself, aware of itself, is a precondition of the experience itself, as Leibniz, in his response to Locke, has rightly pointed out: nisi ipse intellectus (see above). For Kant, who takes on those erroneous assumptions of empiricism, the intellect is no longer given to itself, but can only think about themselves and think of themselves confined within the limits of an experience, based on intuition psychic.
In conclusion, the epistemological critique of Kant does not recognize the limitations of the reason for its own nature, but imposes a limitation inappropriate. This shows that to Kant inadvertently by an empirical premise to prevent the right to acquire knowledge about themselves or about the soul and essence of things, with the causes immanent and transcendent on the first case. The real criticism is in the epistemological tradition that justifies the ability to reason to acquire such metaphysical knowledge but also points out their limitations. Especially since the first transcendent cause (divine) reason comes only with inductive conclusions and similarly inadequate.
Criticism Kantian rationalist metaphysics plays the brilliant and convincing because it insists in strictly empirical basis of scientific knowledge, and rationalism seems to have lost its special metaphysical disciplines of psychology, cosmology and theology. Kant's critical that rational psychology has treated the subject of the soul as "independent of all experience" [18] and has developed a universal doctrine with mere concepts, turning into "strange ideas", literally "cobwebs of the brain" (Hirngespinste). However, what Kant meant by "experience" is merely a sensible experience, conditioned by his theory transcendentalist, excluding any intellectual experience, limiting the categories of the understanding a ciò che è dato nell'intuizione sensitiva esterna ed interna. La mia obiezione a Kant non è che egli ha rilevato condizioni dell'esperienza apriori nel soggetto – per superare l'empirismo – ma che queste condizioni riducono l'esperienza a oggetti-fenomeni costituiti dal soggetto – per superare il razionalismo. Trovi-amo invece nella metafisica tradizionale, con le sue discipline speciali, una migliore alternativa nel rilevare sì una condizione apriori dell'esperienza nel soggetto, non facendo però dell'essere delle cose empiriche un dato sensibile, ma lo riconosce come intelligibile, cioè come dato alla coscienza dell'intelletto. Quest'ultimo è dato anche a se stesso, nell'autocoscienza (cfr. Leibniz: nisi intellectus ipse).
On the contrary, Kant is unacceptable to a dogmatic division between being sensitive and being a transcendental object, between object and object-logical-transcendental phenomenon, [19] between sensuous consciousness and transcendental consciousness, the subject of empirical and intellectual subject transcendental. According to Kant the transcendental subject is not directly given to itself, but only thought of as existing which contradicts, however, mere self-consciousness of our intellect which is present to himself. This also confirms the great tradition, both Plato Augustine, Aquinas and Aristotle, which are based on this natural conscience realistic. The expression of "sensitive conscience," originated empiricism and assumed by Kant, is contradictory in itself, because our consciousness of reality is a natural "with" Scire "(hence comes with-scientia) or with-knowledge (with simple intuition) of the being of things accompanies every experience for their content. This con-formal knowledge is an act of the intellect, not the senses. [20]
As the Kantian critique the rational psychology as well as to theology, that the evidence of the existence of God, stressing the limitations of rational knowledge objects sensory experience based on intuition. Since God is invisible already at the outset we exclude all knowledge about Him In addition, Kant deals only priori deductive demonstrations of rationalism ignoring those posteriori induction of Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. These start at certain features of the empirical world of things to finish their first transcendent cause, identified with God to avoid the misunderstandings that took place in modern times, those characteristics must be understood under the aspect of things worldly. In fact, the first being s. Thomas Aquinas, the movement of things is a bad way of their being, as a potential transition from the current one. Also in the third way of being that is contingent potential of things and concludes on the necessity of their being to the absolute first cause. The fourth part via being less than perfect and, in analogy to a first cause as a first analogy. The fifth way of the things about being in the natural goodness that is its purpose, which refers to a first cause as an end or ultimate good. It is clear that the demonstrations come to the first case starting from the transcendent transcendental characteristics of worldly things. But this aspect of the "transcendental" ontological Kant has lost and replaced with his "transcendental" in the new way subjective.
[1] Imm Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XV, is expressed in the preface to the second edition on metaphysics so that it has proceeded, like other sciences, but he walked in leaning on the experience and groping, "which is the worst among mere concepts."
[2] Plato, Resp VI, 511b, explaining his science of "Dialectic," which "... getting to the principle that no assumptions should take it and thus, adhering to everything depends on it, get off without use of any sensible ideas but only in themselves and in doing so end up ideas. "
[3] See his famous work: J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la métaphysique, 5 vol., Paris, 1944.
[4] Aristotle, Metaph .. XII, 1071b 19-20.
[5] Ibid., II, 993B 7 ss.
[6] See Aristotle, De gener. et corr. II. See my comment in: Beiträge yu Aristoteles' Naturphilosophie, Amsterdam (Rodopi) 1995.
[7] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols. Of 1690.
[8] David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1777.
[9] See also the lucid presentation of modern empiricism, rationalism and Kant in Antonio Livi: The philosophy and history, vol II: The Nineteenth Century, Rome (Ed. Dante alligator.) 1999.
[10] GW Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l'humain entendement of 1704 (published only in 1765).
[11] Imm Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781 (A 421 ff.) And 1787 (448 ff.).
[12] Even Aristotle observes that we might not have a science if not on the basis of sensory perception. Kant's doctrine that we are subjected to a "transcendental appearance, carried out by an inadvertent influence on the intellect of the sensitivity, at 293 et \u200b\u200bseq. / B 349 ff., Remains a mere claim against our natural conscience that testifies to the real existence of things in themselves independent, non-object phenomena, consisting of the "transcendental consciousness."
[13] Critique of Pure Reason, A 426 / B 454 ff.
[14] Ibidem, A 427 / B 455 ff.
[15] Andrea Gentile, The Edge of Reason. The concept of "limit" in transcendental philosophy Kant, Rome (Ed. Studium) 2003.
[16] Loc cit., II. ch.: "The determination of the 'limits' of the 'pure reason', 54 ff.
[17] This would result in an intuition that Kant was right to reject intuitionism in his later writings: Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Tone in der Philosophie, 1796.
[18] A342 / B 400 et passim.
[19] This division is of (neo) Platonic and even intensifies the separation between the sensible world and the intelligible world, between phenomenon and noumenon.
[20] is devoted to this theme, in a historical and systematic way, my treatise: Sein und Bewusstsein. Erörterungen Erkenntnislehre zur Metaphysik und in Gegenüberstellung einer von Aristoteles und Kant, Hildesheim (Olms Verlag) 2001.
(Pont. Lateran Univ.)
Aquinas 47 (2004), 641-652
Prof. Horst Seidl.
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