Marx e Kuhn: la struttura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche
Il paradigma dominante è in ogni tempo il paradigma della classe dominante
1. Introduzione
Ci proponiamo, con questo lavoro, di sostenere che lo sviluppo della scienza segue le stesse leggi che spiegano l’evoluzione della società e che a questo assunto dovrebbero rifarsi i filosofi della scienza discutendo di rivoluzioni scientifiche, paradigmi, scienza normale. Applicando le leggi dell’evoluzione alla scienza è possibile anche fornire una più precisa e feconda concezione del concetto di paradigma.
Come noto, lo sviluppo dell’epistemologia ha seguito ben altre vie. Fino a non molto tempo fa, essa è stata dominata dal neopositivismo. Quando questa concezione è entrata in crisi, ha lasciato il posto a una miscela di idealismo, indeterminismo e relativismo, frutto dell’esplosione dello stesso empirismo logico in tante piccole sette, in conflitto tra loro, concentrate sullo sviluppo della propria versione di idealismo filosofico. La filosofia di Popper, sorta come reazione all’empirismo logico, provided an acceptable criticism of his approach, only to replace it as a practice inadequate. Imperatives dropped from the neo-positivists, Popper replaced other imperatives fell from the top, also useless for the work of scientists.
Kuhn's theory was a shot in the arm for science. No more moral obligations, but simply a description of the development of various disciplines. This is the main merit but also limit the design kuhniana. So it has accelerated the decline of the old religions epistemological, but also promoted the spread of new and possibly worse trends: methodological anarchism, sociology of knowledge. The reason that the theories of Kuhn ran back to the Trojan horse of idealism is to be found in its proper philosophical confusion in the field and particularly in the theory of knowledge. Kuhn was not primarily a historian and has never been able (or interested) to investigate the epistemological basis of its arguments. His theories are descriptions and never get to explain the object of their descriptions.
Now, in the opinion of the writer, the focal point of every epistemological theory is the relationship between theories and facts, or, in the classical sense, between thought and being. This is what divides the schools and methods. This is one of the shortcomings of the theory of Kuhn. The other weakness, in which its critics point the finger, is the vagueness of the concept of paradigm. We will try to analyze the lack both of them, suggesting remedies and then trying to prove that the conception of Kuhn, whether construed in accordance with a more robust theory of knowledge, it provides extremely valuable information to the scientist, the philosopher and historian.
2. Scientific revolutions
In the description of Kuhn, the scientific activity of normal (normal science), it ignores or underestimates the problematic aspects of a theory, focusing in the enrichment of its strengths. For a time, the anomalies begin to accumulate, sempre più inesorabili, sempre meno eludibili. Ad un tratto, l’accumulo genera un effetto soglia, innescando una rivoluzione scientifica che conduce all’abbandono del vecchio paradigma e al sorgere di una nuova concezione scientifica.
Il punto centrale, in questa profonda descrizione dello sviluppo della scienza, è fornire una convincente spiegazione del perché la stessa anomalia può essere ignorata per anni e poi, in altre condizioni, provocare il crollo del paradigma. La storia della scienza ci dice, infatti, che spesso non sono nuove anomalie a provocare la crisi del paradigma, ma si tratta di problemi ben noti ai ricercatori di quel settore, a volte addirittura precedenti al sorgere del nuovo paradigma. La principale criticism that can turn to Kuhn is that his model of science describes as the revolutions in science occur, but not because they take place. The following schools (mainly methodological anarchism, and the various versions of the sociology of knowledge) have provided important clues, but on a philosophical idealist and relativist. Not having been able to provide an explanation of objective, material, scientific development, epistemology had to make a preordained consider scientific revolutions as the result of a purely ideological and political struggle of the various schools.
The real world can also exist (these schools are often agnostic ontological field) ma è ininfluente. Il progresso scientifico sarebbe una questione puramente culturale, sociologica: un gruppo di scienziati si dimostra più furbo o spietato degli altri e impone al mondo la propria interpretazione su cosa sia il reale. Il cammino cominciato secoli fa per fornire una spiegazione razionale al sorgere e declinare delle teorie è così finito in una piena vittoria dell’irrazionalismo. Oggi sappiamo che i fatti non possono decidere univocamente della sorte delle teorie, le quali possono essere sempre difese con stratagemmi ad hoc. Ma dobbiamo per questo rinunciare ad ogni analisi obiettiva della scienza? Un argomento bisogna concederlo alla sociologia della conoscenza: lo sviluppo della scienza procede sulla base di eventi esterni, che ne condizionano deeply the fates.
This is true, but it is not new. Is a cornerstone of the Marxist theory of ideology, demonstrating that it can maintain a link between science and society even in a materialist conception. According to this concept, ideology comes to dominate a certain period of history because it is functional to the fundamental characteristics of a particular mode of production. In other words, ideology is a distorted representation of the company that created it. Therefore, the prevalence of either ideology depends mainly on subjective aspects (the ability of the scientist), but from historical and social aspects, objectively determinable. For example, the creator of methodological anarchism, Feyerabend, tries to explain to all 300 pages of his most famous book (Against Method) that Galileo was right with the cunning of the Ptolemaic theory, and not because of better arguments and evidence .
According to the Marxist ideology, the development of the new bourgeois relations of production would inevitably lead to the downsizing of the ideological power of the Church. In particular, the continuous revolution of technology necessary for the survival of capitalism is incompatible with the dogmas of faith in the natural sciences. Resizing the epistemological role of Christian doctrine was a necessity history. The forms that this need have taken are due to an accidental combination of factors. The Copernican theory, the Enlightenment, Utilitarianism, English political economy, none of these scientific phenomena must inevitably develop. But the substance that unites them (the criticism of religion, the old state power, etc.). Would inevitably exit out vehicle in this or that theory.
E 'then true that, ultimately, a scientific revolution occurs by a change which gives the outside of it. But the link between science and factors "external" is not subjective. In the materialist conception of the relationship between science and society, the development of theories play in the final analysis, the development of society, from which their mutual operation of general laws. The development of capitalism is a phenomenon as an objective of the rotation of the planets. Therefore, the final victory of the Copernican theory to Ptolemy was inevitable as the arrival of spring after winter. If Galileo had been incompetent, or just a rash and then roasted it over, another would take his place, until some scientist had not managed to keep the church hierarchy in its place. Again, the historical form of the conflict between Copernican and the Catholic Church was contingent, but the historical outcome of the fight was already written. Some philosophers can only see the immediate and random processes do not recognize the drivers behind them deep in history. The ability of a caste of scientists, and especially the fear and coercion, may be delayed for decades the victory of a scientific revolution, but in no way can reverse the process objective, which will lead to his historic triumph. The aggressive treatment has never immortalized anyone.
So, science has its profound reasons for the company. This does not mean that every scientific breakthrough can be explained by a change in social conditions of a certain age. The link between science and society is infinitely rich, dialectical, complex. You can make an analogy with art. And 'there is an undeniable link between a certain artistic expression and the times in which it is produced. But it is an indirect relationship, mediated by the personality of the artist and a thousand other factors. Nevertheless there. Guernica Picasso could paint only in the 30s of the twentieth century and in no time.
Likewise, the English classical political economy could not succeed or a century earlier or a century later. Neither could resist the development of capitalism, the social conflicts which have been reflected in a tear in the classical economic theory in opposing theories. Again, Marx and Walras (The founders of these opposing theories) are historical accidents, but the Marxist theory and neoclassical economic theory, as conceptions of the world, would inevitably have arisen according to the development of capitalism. This conception of the relationship between science and society, on closer inspection, maintains and develops the profound sense of Popper's view of positivist science and also because it is ultimately a "fact" (the development of capitalism) to determine the birth and the crisis of a theory. At the same time, adopts the theory of Kuhn as a faithful description of the life of a paradigm. Only, we provide an explanation.
3. Normal science
Scientific revolutions are the turning points epoch-making that happen in history and it is very rare events. Between turns and the other takes place the development of a given society. When a particular system becomes impossible to continue to grow, they create conditions for a new era. But not all scientific revolutions correspond to the socialist revolution. This applies only to the overall ideological framework to which all individual theories, however, should refer in one way or another. Besides the truly epochal upheaval (think of the French Revolution, the Russian revolution, the fall of the Roman Empire, etc..) Changes are minor but still significant. For example, capitalism has undergone a major changes since the industrial revolution. Would transfer these mechanical changes in science and propose a scheme like this: great social change = great scientific revolution, social change mean = mean scientific revolution and so on.
However, one should not underestimate the effect it has on scientists the cultural atmosphere we breathe, the pressures from, for a thousand ways, by social conflicts. Furthermore, stages of rapid economic development lead to major technological innovations, which, under modern conditions, are the basis of almost all the discoveries and theories of natural science. But the connection between science and society serves to highlight another key aspect: the role of normal science. As mentioned, the social changes are rare events in history (in the West 3-4 in thousands of years). This does not mean that nothing happens between two revolutions. The revolution created the foundations for a new era of development, suddenly getting rid of the remnants of the past. Until the new relations of production are proving fruitful in general (that is, ultimately, until the yield of social work), not the conditions for another change.
This does not mean that the various social and political actors to accept everything that is as inevitable. Indeed, history teaches us that soon after the revolution start fights often furious and not just a rearguard. But these struggles, as long as the system expands, are intended to recompose, or are otherwise lost. This does not make them useless: the struggle for the reduction of working time, developed at the dawn of capitalism, now allows a worker to remain in European company only 8-9 hours compared to 15-20 century. To strive for improvement of their living conditions within a given system is never out of place, although sometimes you do not take home anything.
Well, this is precisely the condition which Kuhn calls normal science. Once a paradigm is formed, at least in its fundamental features of science and especially ideological, methodological, political, all the criticism al paradigma si trasforma in critica nel paradigma, il quale, finché resta fecondo, convince gli scienziati a procedere riformandolo anziché abbattendolo. Il parallelo è sia storico (perché per le ragioni dette, è tipico che epoche di pacifico sviluppo quantitativo si accompagnino al fiorire della scienza normale all’interno dei paradigmi scientifici dati), sia strutturale, nel senso che segue una dinamica assai simile: anche nel paradigma vi sono lunghi periodi di sviluppo quantitativo e poi brusche svolte rivoluzionarie.
Proprio come nella società, tra una rivoluzione scientifica e l’altra non vi è affatto una desolante bonaccia. Gli scienziati, pur all’interno dello stesso paradigma, si combattono aspramente, si criticano, producono scoperte rilevanti e così via. Come noto, quando Kuhn propose la sua idea di scienza normale, nessuno poté negare l’esistenza e l’importanza di questo fenomeno. Ci fu però chi criticò moralmente gli “scienziati normali”. Popper arrivò a dire che si dovevano vergognare e che lui, come il rivoluzionario Trotskij in politica, era per la rivoluzione permanente.
Ora, un approccio critico è importante e su questo non si può che concordare con Popper. Ma è ingenuo, e sviante, credere che l’atteggiamento degli scienziati possa derivare da un imperativo morale caduto dall’alto, proprio come avviene in politica. In fondo, gli stessi Lenin Trotsky and spent most of their lives dreaming of a revolution unworkable. As one can be a fervent revolutionary, the revolution needs to objective conditions independent of him. When someone has attempted to overthrow the regime in the absence of these conditions was easily crushed. When a scientist is a critical paradigm, which are not yet created the conditions for this to be exceeded, you can find some plays, get his magazine and his disciples, but will remain always in a minority. In normal times, disputes take place within the scientific paradigm and is therefore useful to clarify this concept, pulling out of indeterminacy in cui lo stesso Kuhn lo ha lasciato.
4. Sulla struttura dei paradigmi scientifici
Si potrebbe dire che per difendere il concetto di paradigma non c’è che da osservarne la fortuna: il fatto che tutti gli epistemologi successivi a Kuhn siano stati costretti a introdurre tale concetto nel loro sistema, seppur con altri nomi, dovrebbe essere prova sufficiente della sua validità[1]. Lakatos in particolare, quale erede designato di Popper avrebbe dovuto continuare la lotta all’epistemologia descrittiva di Kuhn, eppure si è dovuto piegare, tentando malamente di conciliare le due scuole e creando un sistema sincretico, che potremmo descrivere come retorica viennese in salsa americana. Basti notare che il falsificazionismo “sofisticato”, cioè quello di Lakatos, è sofisticato in quanto contaminato da Kuhn. Il concetto di paradigma dunque ha una straordinaria potenza esplicativa, ma deve essere decisamente reinterpretato per acquisire un ruolo progressivo nella comprensione del vero sviluppo della scienza.
Premettendo che non è affatto nostra intenzione prenderci il merito di aver proposto per la prima volta l’arricchimento del concetto di paradigma[2], l’idea è quella di considerare il paradigma come un albero, formato da una vasta serie di riferimenti intellettuali (le radici), convogliate da uno o più fondatori in un corpus organico (il tronco) che, non appena la teoria acquisisce un certo successo, esplode in a branch. At first it consists of few main hubs, after also are divided in their turn until the tree, that is the paradigm, it presents a series of multiple variants, but each dating back to a path (which can be done historically, but which is also analytic) up the trunk and roots.
The metaphor must be deepened. The trunk is common to all. This means that the different schools within a paradigm must still share a basic minimum. Not only that, but the more the schools have in common (ie they are on the same branch or even on the same side branch), the more theoretical and empirical substratum share. Proceeding branching in, the paradigm becomes more stringent and therefore defined by a practical point of view. Eventually, the paradigm in the tree on a branch, is located a school made up perhaps by one scientist and his more orthodox disciples. Obviously, there are trees and trees. There are hundreds of oak trees with branches far apart, and there are cypress trees, whose branches, very close to each other, all pointing in the same direction.
But branching is the paradigm of the situation from another point of view. The branches have a hierarchy between them, well represented by the fact that you can not find a bigger branch of the branch that supports it. Transposed in the life science, this means che mano a mano che il paradigma attira ricercatori, si va dividendo, innanzitutto, tra alcune grandi opzioni nell’interpretazione della rivoluzione scientifica che è avvenuta (ovvero nella prima generazione, ma torneremo su questo). Poi, ogni ramo comincia a fare una vita a sé, suddividendosi ulteriormente. Ma proprio come in un albero, i rametti sono suddivisioni dei rami e così via a ritroso fino al tronco. Così la singola scuola fa riferimento innanzitutto alla specifica interpretazione da cui proviene e solo in seconda battuta al paradigma più comprensivo, anche se, ovviamente, uno scienziato può cambiare idea e spostarsi su un altro ramo (o addirittura albero). La ramificazione, serve anche a comprendere come il paradigma compared with the empirical material. Anomalies (or potential counterfeiters, as Popper described them) are not all equal.
Normally, the empirical disconfirmation of the theory hits the stick, or at a branch, but never comes to saw the trunk, or to start a scientific revolution, for which it takes very precise external conditions. Moreover, just as with plants, seeds are always fallen from the trees that now allow the birth of the trees of tomorrow. When a rupture occurs, as mentioned, has its reasons in events outside the paradigm, but that interact with the development of the paradigm, the strength of the break will depend critically:
a) the extent where the levels of the paradigm are consistent with each other;
b) the extent to which there are substitutes.
Consistency means the acceptance of theories related analytical and / or empirically between them. If the homogeneity is high, the deficiency may affect the main branches of the paradigm, resulting in a nearly simultaneous threshold effects at all levels. In general, this occurs when the anomaly is logical, theoretical (think of how Gödel's theorem in the '30s hit any attempt to axiomatization of mathematics, starting from the paper Hilbert). When it is hit from the top of thumb, that the individual school, the more directly linked to these forecasts. The same
Kuhn explained how anomalies are challenged and not counted against the scientist and the paradigm, because the same general theories from specific predictions can be drawn even opposite. This process, during which the paradigm retains its appeal, is because the paradigm of a number of scientists are fighting for hegemony. The purpose of this criticism is not scuttle the paradigm, but rather destroy the rival schools, while maintaining the good general paradigm. You want to prune the tree, do not shoot it down.
The phenomenon of an empirical attribution of failure is fundamental to capire come avvenga la lotta tra paradigmi e nel paradigma. E' inutile ribadire che in realtà una teoria non si farà mai sconfiggere da un fatto, come credeva un tempo Popper, piuttosto è nel conflitto tra teorie e paradigmi che si inserisce l’interpretazione dei dati empirici. Analizzando l’evoluzione dei paradigmi, appare chiaro che i risultati dell’attacco sono sempre connessi con l’esistenza di un’alternativa: una teoria è colpita da un fatto nella misura in cui un’altra ne è favorita, e quando nessuna teoria ha da proporre niente riguardo a un argomento, ciò è indice di grave difficoltà della disciplina. Dato quel che si è detto sulla stratificazione paradigmatica, le anomalie can no longer be considered a paradigm of indiscriminate enemy. In reality, most schools can affect different paradigms that two schools in the same paradigm. That brings us to the central problem of theoretical struggle.
addition to the struggles between paradigms, culminating, as described by Kuhn, with the victory of a paradigm that banishes the rest of science and rewrites the past in its glorification, there are also fights intraparadigmatiche. If a school accepts the tenets of the paradigm, it will pay up arms against them until they deemed out of the paradigm. The individual researcher may even seem like a personal decision, but as mentioned, the choice of the revolution or reform of the paradigm is based on an objective process. During the period of struggle within the common theory, a school directly attack the opponent on issues that divide them. This means that it will support its interpretation of the paradigm is the only valid and the other branches are dogmatic or deviants, traitors, renegades, and so on.
The outlet of this type of struggle, of course, that does not depend only on theoretical or empirical results in the emergence of a dominant view within the paradigm. The schools may merge into the mainstream defeats, to adapt to stay in the shadows for a while 'or even, in special circumstances, choose to exit and relaunch the paradigm compared to the level of paradigm against paradigm.
As a rule, we can say that the more the level of confrontation is "high" that is, analytical, abstract, the greater will be the battle and then the eventual split.
Of course, as the new paradigm will not fall from heaven but is the result of the battle in the old conceptual framework, he often receives many theoretical elements. However, if it stands, it is because the reference is too weak to be considered a school division only more heretical than others. They are also the scientists themselves "splitters" to declare usually split, but here it is necessary be careful. For various reasons there may be scientists who pretend that there is continuity, in order to facilitate the success of the new paradigm. Kuhn's idea that the proliferation of versions of the paradigm is the demonstration of its crisis is therefore superficial and wrong, in my opinion, rejected. The proliferation of versions of the paradigm is rather a necessary stage in the development of science and prepare the revolution and the birth of new paradigms. The trees with thousands of branches and foliage are healthier than those bare.
stratification paradigm occurs after the basic methodological approach that distinguishes it got better. And 'in fact difficult to think of a paradigm that came to power already ready. Even here the analogy seems illuminating. The trees are not born like little miniature trees, but with a totally different form and very few branches. Plant growth leads to its ramifications. This fits well with the idea kuhniana paradigm, which explicitly states that there are still many issues left open at its rising, which attract the intellectual curiosity of scientists. Although the paradigms are not equal to each other, but it is possible to find at least one common element: all are more or less stratified.
Let us now study the dynamics for which the epistemological paradigm is divided internally. The paradigm stems from a heretical school of the old theory. The struggle in the dominant paradigm creates the conditions for the emergence of the new paradigm. There are no known examples where a paradigm may have arisen out of the blue already formed, without any previous reference to science. Not however in modern science. The paradigm is born referring, perhaps to a difference in the dominant or the mainstream, perhaps in other disciplines. Then becomes dominant and begins its expansion.
If science is advanced enough, it will be mainly to convince the recalcitrant "nostalgic" to leave or convert. How many converts are often the seeds of future intraparadigmatica fight, but even here the case can be inverted, and converted the king may be more realistic. Also rely also on aspects such as product differentiation advantage of scientific (proposing a model slightly different from the standard to post more), the different conceptions of national, local traditions of a paradigm that we are somehow infused into the new and so on.
The fight against the new paradigm is the remains of old weapons is conducted with very little scientific and noble: they cut the funds and are isolated irreducible gain the editorial boards of journals, are placed in key positions in the their students, and so on. In this, the analysis provided by the sociologists of knowledge are shared. In addition, a theory of necessity has weaknesses. Just to prove that the weaknesses of previous theories are the cornerstone of the new science and solves them and that is that the new paradigm is built the scientific justification for euthanasia of the old.
This also enters the phenomenon of generational change, as Kuhn himself had suggested. In fact, the generation that will mostly normal science, picking up the legacy of the founder, is in a very stormy and very fruitful. A founder of any science is a thinker who creates a new paradigm, breaking with old ideas. As the master lived, as he wrote profusely and clearly sulle proprie teorie, avrà sicuramente lasciato agli allievi un mare di dubbi, lacune, incertezze e contraddizioni. Tanto più questo accadrà con quei pensatori originali e geniali che si sono occupati di molti aspetti del reale e da tante angolazioni.
Le teorie del fondatore o dei fondatori risulteranno più o meno chiare ma comunque ci sarà sicuramente un alone di interpretatività lasciato agli eredi. La schiera di allievi inizia il processo di estensione e approfondimento del paradigma. Questa estensione porterà alla nascita di scuole separate. Non importa quanto fedeli o spregiudicati siano gli allievi nel giudicare il pensiero del maestro, non importa quanto preciso sia il paradigma, ineluttabilmente nasceranno scuole diverse rivals and to varying degrees. This process is fundamental to understanding the new concept of paradigm and its stratification, and is a process associated with the role of normal science. To sum up in a school, or more generally of a paradigm, the second generation develops the model, the theory, knowledge in some direction. What are the forces that closer or farther away from the new paradigm? Assuming that often the real reasons are not clear even to the same scientist, we can distinguish:
a) forces "attractive" mainly the material force of the paradigm and open problems. The 'power' is an obvious argument: that guarantees career to join? What punishment you could convert? These are speeches that scientists do since I was in college when they receive the Nobel Prize. But also count for a lot of open problems. And 'why normal science is linked inextricably to the second stage of the life of a paradigm. When the paradigm has earned a place in their discipline, be able to attract students if they see the possibility of using the paradigm to new problems. They will want to use that paradigm to solve new problems and stop asking questions on the paradigm itself.
If the theory is insusceptible of progressive changes, the scientists they are apathetic. In this, the component also plays a role of intellectual vanity. Scientists do not like to apply in a routine that already created entirely by others. But above all, the theory serves to explain the new situation. It must explain new events that the founder could not have in mind if not in part. The objective conditions are also, especially in the social sciences, a huge boost, even if not decisive. It 'clear, for example, that the deep economic crisis of the '30s away from the theories of many economists who deny that capitalism can go through the crisis.
However, the paradigm can conquer the field for various reasons, but maintains its attractiveness if it helps to do research to determine the scope of work. Basically his job is just that: provide a framework for the work of the scientist. Easily, a newborn paradigm will be more exciting but also "handling", that is just framed. Then, next to the school founder, who may even be put into a corner, they will reach a series of new interpretations, extensions, enrichment of the paradigm. Thus, the scientist who started his career after winning the paradigm, is not attracted by the paradigm tout court but by the individual school paradigm.
All of these processes in the natural sciences are seen less as the historical and social conditions affect more indirectly. Certainly, the success of the paradigm also has the ability of the individual scientist or the individual schools, especially in the short run, but you can not get to the exaggerations of those who, like Feyerabend, gives this a decisive factor. To take the case of Galileo as Gould wrote, is not enough for Galileo to be persecuted, it must be right. In fact today there is talk of scientific theories of Copernicus and Galileo a step forward because they were objective. Not so for the theories of other heretics who were also persecuted, but not for the discovery of new "facts."
b) forces "repulsive" the scientist will be rejected by a paradigm in crisis or too orthodox or completely undefined. As mentioned, Kuhn for the proliferation of versions of the paradigm is bad. In fact, unless this proliferation means a series of real divisions in which scientists abandon the paradigm, the opposite is true. Proliferation within the paradigm reinforces that, while the spread of defections is the result of the crisis of the paradigm, not its cause. Of course, in that case, the proliferation in turn feed into the process of crisis.
Finally, the layering paradigm has experienced a fundamental phenomenon of modern production: the division of labor. Just because the creators of the paradigm are often versatile scientists, thinkers universal, can set up new concepts, but then with increasing research on the paradigm, it becomes operative specialization. Capitalist production pushes science to the fragmentation. The paradigm is so layered in a sense to follow the division of labor. The same paradigm is stratified not only because scientists have different opinions on the same subject but because dealing with different topics. The theory of stratification is therefore a cause of material in the social division of labor. A process of production based on division of labor can not match a science and epistemology in which the "experts" share the work. The relationship between science and production process changes for the scientific and social division of labor.
5. A reformulation of the theory of materialist Kuhn
The general conception that we have proposed on the links between science and history can be further refined taking in more detail the similarities between the laws of motion of the revolutions in society and knowledge.
In Marx's theory of revolution, the development of productive forces is almost continuous accumulation of new inputs, new knowledge and so on. The relations of production that determines the ratio of classes in the production process, have the task of guiding the exploitation of these productive forces. At one time this function their guidance is less because the development of productive forces beyond them. Takes over a period of revolution, the relations of production are transformed and the productive forces can continue to grow [3]. For those who think the description that Kuhn is the development of new paradigms, the close similarity of the two processes can not fail. Let us begin with trying to "restore" the concepts used by Marx in the world of scientific paradigms.
What are the forces of production in science? Let's start by saying that the concept of productive forces in Marx is not just technical, quantitative: there he covers the same class of producers, as well as scientific knowledge embedded in machines and in that class. So we define the set of productive forces science and scientific knowledge in general "software" of knowledge but also the class of scientists and equipment (the 'hardware'), or the means of scientific production (laboratories, research centers, instrumentation ). There remains to determine what are the relations of scientific production. In society, the relations of production are essentially the way it relates to the class that owns the means of production and appropriates the results of the production process and the class that controls the means of production.
There is therefore both a static aspect (property) and dynamic (the use of the property for espandere la sfera della produzione). Nella nostra epoca questi due aspetti sono compendiati dal concetto di capitale, che incorpora tanto la proprietà che la funzione dei mezzi che la società si è data per produrre. Nella scienza, l’aspetto statico (la proprietà) non riveste particolare interesse perché ciò che è materiale è ovviamente già di proprietà di qualcuno (il laboratorio ecc.), e ciò che è immateriale serve solo se connesso alla produzione. Ad esempio, uno scienziato che trova un nuovo materiale chimico, finché mantiene questa scoperta su un foglio, non modifica nulla nel processo produttivo (né nel suo conto in banca). Non appena questa scoperta o invenzione entra nella sfera produttiva diviene utile, cioè appropriabile da qualcuno.
Pertanto, i rapporti di produzione all’interno della scienza derivano dalle forme di proprietà dominanti in una determinata epoca. Non solo, ma il modo con cui gli scienziati si rapportano con il proprio ruolo, e cioè la concezione dominante di cos’è e come si fa la scienza (l’ideologia e l’epistemologia dominanti), derivano dall’ideologia dominante a livello generale.
A) La rivoluzione
Sull’analogia e le relazioni tra rivoluzioni sociali e scientifiche si è già detto. Lo sviluppo della scienza è fortemente collegato con lo sviluppo della società e nella nostra epoca si tratta di a circular process, with new scientific knowledge that will allow an increase in social productivity and thus a development of the productive forces. Sure, there are also cases in which a thriving science is opposed to a society in crisis, or cases in which the company makes great strides as science or latita vivacchia. However, this is not the case in our society. Indeed, capitalism in the feedback becomes more stringent, resulting in a continuous run between science and development of means of production.
course, define the scientific progress is in itself an insoluble problem (as we know from the failure of falsification), but what we are interested in assessing not so much the skill of intellectual speculation, as the ability to transform new scientific knowledge in technological progress. The very fact that scientists deal without connecting to speculate what they do with the productive development could be a sign of social crisis. Let's take the example of Leonardo. Undoubtedly he was one of the greatest geniuses of mankind, the best sample of the rebirth of rationality after the night of the Middle Ages.
As you know Leonardo takes care of everything, "invented" everything from tank helicopter. Yet, to the extent that the find of Leonardo did not represent a degree of development of society but some extraordinary find of a genius, they were almost all useless to his contemporaries. And today we can say that enrich humanity more works of art by Leonardo that a good number of sketches to build models and perhaps unnecessary since their conception, just as now the science fiction books do not help in any way a physical ship or build a time machine. Leonardo's case serves to demonstrate that scientific progress is not found in a brilliant mind, but in the ability to actually develop the productive forces.
But the most striking example of a science flourishing in a stagnant society is perhaps one of the Greeks of the Classic. For centuries, Greek philosophers and mathematicians have provided the world with extraordinary ideas and discoveries, many of which are in use even today (think of the Euclidean geometry, Aristotelian logic, many mathematical problems and Archimedean Diophantine etc...) Yet the company was hardly dynamic, being based on slavery, which in itself prevents any rapid progress. It 'a unique case and you can tell by the fact that the Roman Empire, with infinitely more productive resources available, has made contributions to science and mathematics infinitely smaller. It 's more important one for the history of philosophy, Plato, Archimedes, or math, which all philosophers and mathematicians of Rome from its founding to crollo dell’Impero romano d’Occidente.
Nella Grecia classica i problemi concreti della società davano il via a speculazioni di filosofi “specializzati” ad astrarre e a pensare al nocciolo analitico del problema più che al suo risvolto operativo. Così la Grecia antica fu invasa da praticamente tutti i suoi vicini, più forti militarmente. Eppure, anche un bravo storico della filosofia troverebbe difficile ricordare il nome di uno solo dei filosofi persiani o macedoni o romani di quel tempo. La scarsa comunicazione tra scienza e tecnologia era dovuta al fatto che la classe a cui era dispensato di lavorare, la classe dei Platone e degli Aristotele, non si occupava di produzione. L’economia schiavile non investiva praticamente nulla. Era un’economia in cui solo eventi straordinari al di fuori del ciclo normale portavano dei cambiamenti (guerre, calamità). Con questi eventi eccezionali arrivavano nuovi schiavi e la società aveva nuovo combustibile per andare avanti. Il capitalismo invece ha creato un rapporto organico, permanente tra scienza e processo produttivo. Un rapporto sostanzialmente di subordinazione della scienza all’economia ma comunque fecondo.
Gli scienziati sono dei professionisti, la scienza è un mestiere, come anche l’arte. Nell’arte come nella scienza vi è un canale già pronto che stimola, raccoglie e sfrutta l’inventiva umana. Ovviamente, i fisici, gli economisti, come i cantanti e the actors must play music that does not face disappointment (to put it mildly) of their respective owners. However, both in art as in science there is a wide range of views and the producers know more intelligent use of its "artists" even when they are most gifted of the rebels. All this certainly within prudent limits, even the longest leash at some point there is a tendency. Similarly, if a scientist wants to break with the dominant ideology must prepare for the cold winters dell'eterodossia. That, however, are preferable to the warm winters of the burning of heretics, or books of the past.
B) The development of productive forces, scientific
Development of productive forces, science is given the resources that society makes available to the science. These resources in capitalism are linked to the profits that technological innovation can generate. Scientists discover, thanks to new resources and previous studies, new theories. The productive forces of science, just as the social productive forces, advancing almost without interruption. This is the essence of normal science, its basic objective and necessary. The productive forces, into a new company and a new paradigm, in front of them a period of growth, the first rapid and then more tumultuous arrancante, and this development is quite progressive. The continued accumulation new discoveries and new means of production, increasing the productive forces, undermines the old theories and ideologies, leading to social and scientific revolutions (usually in that order), giving rise, in a period of tumultuous upheaval, a new paradigm and a new society. This is the foundation on which to develop the sciences.
However, the reasons why a paradigm in crisis are internal, for example due to lack of logical coherence or simply a contradiction between new discoveries and old theory. But infinitely more important and decisive is the function taking classes in the historical development. Each class has been the locomotive for a period of history. A a part of his life, however, each class becomes a burden, the train begins to slow down and even risk of derailing. However, this mechanism does not seem nearly as neutral as he describes it. A psychologist might point out that no one likes to feel old, let alone a whole class that has dominated the world for centuries. But here there is also much more. Since its historic rise of a class forges the weapons with which to dominate the world. First, these weapons are ideological and scientific. Ultimately have a superior vision of the world. Naturally higher than the class that had hitherto managed the company.
This vision inevitably incorporates a clause that is to say that the arrival the power of that particular class puts an end to human history. Second class values \u200b\u200bin question are inevitably extended beyond historical bond, making the realization of the very essence of humanity. This ideology then changes over time. From revolutionary becomes a placid manage day-to-day stage of maturity. Finally, it becomes a reactionary defense of the grim and when the new ruling class has also become a piece of scrap metal, which was by locomotive. The clauses that incorporated but eternity remains. Are indeed those who shape the vision itself. During the ascent, when the class that aspires to transform the world objectively progressive class, the materialist world view is inevitably. Slowly it becomes rather subjective, relativist. Before the prevailing universalistic concepts and progress. Gradually take over visions minute, special interests, increasingly conservative. With the changing of the function that the class, compared to the progress of productive forces, thus also change its ideology and with it many scientific paradigms. We can therefore say that the only scientific paradigms do not change with changing society, but also with the changing role of the classes that compose them.
This whole process is complicated by the existence of the layering paradigm that we spoken. In fact, the scientific revolution, especially in the social sciences, not swept away in a night earlier theories. Rather than attacking the orthodoxy begins with a heterodox school of the dominant paradigm. At one point the school is a split or simply unorthodox hegemonized the old paradigm and the change from within. Often, the edge of the old paradigm, there are several schools heretical uniforms slowly unify new discoveries or re-using old theories, other times the Orthodox are a time to be so revolutionary. The cases are different, the important thing is to connect through objective processes of science and society. The victory of one paradigm to another has to do with external phenomena alla singola scienza o teoria, ma è la scienza nel suo complesso che è legata inestricabilmente a questi processi. La crisi o la vittoria di un paradigma sono in ultima analisi la crisi o la vittoria di una classe e di una società.
6. Conclusioni
La scienza e la società, nel loro sviluppo, sono strettamente collegate. Non solo le leggi di questo sviluppo sono precisamente le stesse, ma i due processi si intersecano e influenzano a vicenda. Le esigenze sociali della classe dominante si cristallizzano in un paradigma e nella sua storia di stratificazioni, lotte intestine, parziali rivolgimenti, fino a una morte decretata per lo più in concomitanza con la morte dei propri referenti sociali. La spiegazione di questa stratificazione and objective basis of normal science does not want to be a justification. We absolutely right when he says to Popper the "permanent revolution" in science (except substitute the reaction in the social standing), why not just explain all periods of history can be revolutionary for science and society.
The great contribution that Kuhn has given the understanding of science is unfortunately lost in the maze of an unnecessary and cynical relativism, which is defending the status quo through the equal of any scientific theory, of every creed and ideology with the "discovery "it is impossible to settle inland purely scientific disputes teoriche. Ma, seppure consideriamo questo sviluppo della filosofia della scienza come nefasto, ne accettiamo un presupposto che peraltro risale a molto tempo addietro e cioè che nessuno scienziato può pensare di disinteressarsi non solo e non tanto della filosofia della scienza ma soprattutto della società in cui vive. La scienza non può sperare di lasciar perdere la politica credendo che essa lascerà perdere lei. L’unico modo per avere le idee chiare sul proprio lavoro, come scienziati e come cittadini di questa epoca, è di comprendere le determinanti dello sviluppo di questa società.
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[1] Think of the traditions of Laudan, hard-core research programs of Lakatos, and so on.
[2] Although there is ever find a perfect equivalent of the theory are going to propose, some passages in the book of M. Cini is a paradise lost, approach much to these ideas (p. 200 et seq.) Something similar is also found in the writings of Laudan Hausman and cited references.
[3] We refer to Marx's theory of historical development in general. But above all we have in mind the famous passage, albeit a bit 'mechanically, the sums so dear:
"in the social production of their existence, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production corresponding to a certain degree of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions, in general, the process of social, political and intellectual life. Is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, ie with the property relations (which are only legal expression) in which these forces are the first were moved.
These reports, on forms of development of productive forces, turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic base is more or less rapidly upsets the whole immense superstructure. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical, ideological forms enabling men become conscious of this conflict and fight. As one can not judge a man by the idea he has of himself, so one can not judge such a period of transformation of consciousness that it has of itself, this consciousness must be explained rather from contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and relations of production.
social order does not perish until they have developed all the productive forces which may initiate, new and higher relations of production never appear before they have matured within the old society the material conditions of their existence. That is why mankind always sets itself only such problems can be solved, because, looking at things closely, you can always find that the problem arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in formazione. A grandi linee, i modi di produzione asiatico, feudale e borghese moderno possono essere designati come epoche che marcano il progresso della formazione economica della società. I rapporti di produzione borghese sono l’ultima forma antagonistica del processo di produzione sociale; antagonistica non nel senso di un antagonismo individuale, ma di un antagonismo che sorga dalle condizioni di vita sociali degli individui. Ma le forze produttive che si sviluppano nel seno della società borghese creano in pari tempo le condizioni materiali per la soluzione di questo antagonismo. Con questa formazione sociale si chiude dunque la preistoria della società umana” (Prefazione a Per la critica dell’economia politica, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1967, pp. 5-6).
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